CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL)

SYSTEM:

ASI

SUBSYSTEM: REV & DATE: ET Interface Hardware J, 12-19-97

DCN & DATE:

ANALYSTS:

FUNCTIONAL CRIT: PHASE(S): HAZARD REF:

5.11

FAILURE MODE:

Structural Failure

FAILURE EFFECT:

Loss of mission and vehicle/crew due to collapse of interface system resulting in fire/explosion.

C. Rush/E. Howell

TIME TO EFFECT:

Immediate

FAILURE CAUSE(S):

Improper Manufacture

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

Not Applicable

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION: Provides structural load path from ET to Orbiter/ET interface.

FMEA ITEM CODE(S)	PART NO.	PART NAME	OTY	EFFECTIVITY
4.5.28.1	80911071742-001	Pin, (Vertical Strut, Upper)	2	LWT-54 & Up

REMARKS:

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) CONTINUATION SHEET

SYSTEM:

SUBSYSTEM:

Δ

ET Interface Wardware

REV & DATE: DCN & DATE: J, 12-19-97

FMEA ITEM CODE(S):

4.5.28.1

RATIONALE FOR RETENTION

DESIGN:

The pin is made from AMS-5663 PPT HT Incomel bar stock and is CAD plated. Materials are selected in accordance with MMC-ET-SE16 which assures repetitive conformance of composition and properties. Surface integrity is assured by penetrant inspection per STP2501. The pin is designed to the required ultimate safety factor of 1.4 (ET Stress Report 826-2188).

TEST:

The Pin, (Vertical Strut, Upper) is certified. Reference HCS MMC-ET-TM08-L-S123 (LWT-54 thru 88) and HCS MMC-ET-TM08-L-S516 (LWT-89 & Up).

INSPECTION:

Vendor Inspection - Lockheed Martin Surveillance:

Verify materials selection and verification controls (MMC-ET-SE16, drawing 80911071742).

Penetrant inspect part (drawing 80911071742 and STP2501 Type 1 Method A).

Verify dimensional conformance (drawing 80911071742).

FAILURE HISTORY:

Current data on test failures, unexplained anomalies and other failures experienced during ground processing activity can be found in the PRACA data base.